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This paper develops a model to study the effects of foreign aid on the creation and distribution of 
wealth in the recipient country.  It considers three types of foreign aid: permanent grants to all 
individuals, temporary grants to uneducated workers, and foreign aid in the form of low interest rate 
loans to individuals who invest in education.  The model shows that the economy may have two 
long-run equilibria, a rich equilibrium and a poor one. All types of foreign aid can increase the 
proportion of individuals investing in education, which means more people converging to the rich 
equilibrium and higher average wealth in the economy.  In addition, if permanent or temporary 
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THE EFFECTS OF FOREIGN AID ON THE CREATION AND DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH 
1.   INTRODUCTION 
Since World War II, the volume of foreign aid has increased drastically from a few hundred million 
US dollars to about US$50 billion in early 1980s, and peaked at US$69 billion (in 1995 prices) in 
1991 (World Bank, 1998a).  Foreign aid has also grown in significance in many recipient countries’ 
government finance.  For the 50 most aid-dependent countries, foreign aid accounted for, on 
average, 53.8% of central governments’ expenditures over the period from 1975 to 1995 (World 
Bank, 1998b).  Despite the vast transfer of resources, there is no clear evidence that foreign aid 
has delivered its promise of promoting economic development and reducing poverty 
(Michalopoulos and Sukhatme, 1989).  Indeed many countries experienced declines in living 
standards over the period when the amounts of aid they received rose.  According to United 
Nations’ Human Development Report (1996), 70 countries had lower average incomes in 1995 
than they did in 1980, and 43 of these countries had lower average incomes than they did in 1970.  
By the late 1990s, more than a billion people lived on less than $1 a day, and even more people 
lack basic services such as clean water, sanitation, electricity, and schooling (World Bank, 1998a).  
The dire situation has prompted renewed calls for increasing aid to poor countries.  In July 2005, 
G8 leaders agreed to double aid to Africa by 2010 and eliminate debts for the poorest countries. 
 
What can we realistically expect the increased aid effort to achieve?  How to improve the 
effectiveness of foreign aid?  To answer these questions, it is important to understand the 
mechanisms through which foreign aid may contribute to economic development in recipient 
countries, and the conditions under which these mechanisms work well or poorly.  There is a large 
body of empirical literature on the effectiveness of foreign aid on economic development (see 
Hansen and Tarp, 2000 for a review).  In comparison, there are only a few theoretical studies that 
investigate the mechanisms through which aid may impact on growth.  Mosley et al. (1987) 
develop a model to investigate the how aid affects the constraints and decisions of the recipient 
governments which in turn influences the output level of the recipient country.  Boone (1996) 
develops a theoretical model that examines how different types of governments may use aid funds 
differently.   Djajic et al. (1999) and Benarroch and Gaisford (2004) analyse the role of aid in the 
context of international trade, with the former focusing on how aid affects technology transfer and 
the latter on the terms of trade.  Gong and Zou (2000, 2001) study the impact of foreign aid on 
capital accumulation, foreign borrowing, labor supply and consumption.  Most recently, Chatterjee 
and Turnovsky (2005) examine how public investment financed by aid may affect economic growth 
and welfare.  
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This paper investigates a different channel through which foreign aid can affect the creation and 
distribution of wealth in the recipient country.  In particular, we consider how three different types 
foreign aid – permanent grants to all individuals, temporary grants to uneducated workers, and 
foreign aid in the form of low interest rate loans to individuals who invest in education – may affect 
individuals’ decisions to invest in education, which in turn determines the long-run average level of 
wealth in the economy as well as the distribution of wealth between uneducated (unskilled) and 
educated (skilled) individuals.   
 
For our investigation, we develop an overlapping-generations model similar to that of Galor and 
Zeira (1993).
†  In our model, individuals live for two periods and derive utility from both 
consumption and a bequest.  In the first period, they decide whether or not to invest in education.  
If they do, they work as skilled labor in the second period, otherwise they work as unskilled labor in 
both periods.  All individuals are assumed to be identical in all aspects except in their inherited 
wealth.  Education is indivisible and requires a lump sum payment in period one.  Individuals can 
use their inheritance (if that is large enough) for their education, or they can borrow.  It is assumed 
that lenders have to incur monitoring costs to ensure that loans are paid in full when they are due; 
as a result, interest paid by debtors are higher than that received by creditors.   Because of 
relatively high borrowing costs, individuals who have sufficient inheritance to fund education 
without borrowing have better access to education than those who need to borrow (Beker, 1975).  
Consequently, the initial level of wealth can affect individuals’ decisions regarding education.  The 
education decisions in turn affect output and inheritance of the next generation, which then impact 
on later education decisions, and so on.  Hence, initial wealth not only has short run implications 
but also affects education decisions and income distribution in the long run.   This suggests that 
altering the level of initial wealth may have far-reaching effects on an economy’s long-term 
prosperity.  Given that foreign aid can be used to alter the initial wealth level of individuals, it can 
increase the aggregate level of education investment in the recipient country, thereby stimulating 
wealth creation through human capital accumulation, and improving income distribution by 
increasing the proportion of skilled workers in the labor force.    
 
Two features of human capital in our model are worth noting.  Firstly, in our model, an individual’s 
education decision and consequently human capital formation is influenced by parental input (in 
the form of heritance).  The role of parents in human capital formation of children has been studied 
by, for instance, Becker and Tomes (1986) and recognised in Galor and Tisddon (1997).   
Secondly, since in our model foreign aid stimulates economic development through promoting 
human capital formation, the driving force behind economic development is human capital, not 
                                                  
† Galor and Zeira (1993) explore how investment in human capital affects income distribution and 
macroeconomic adjustment to aggregate shocks.  They do not consider foreign aid in their analysis.   4
foreign aid per se.  The importance of human capital in economic development is of course well 
accepted in the literature.  Indeed recent studies suggest that whereas physical capital 
accumulation was a prime engine of growth in earlier stages of economic development, modern 
growth is increasingly relying on human capital formation (see Galor and Moav, 2004).  
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows.  Section 2 sets out the basic model and investigates 
the impact of permanent foreign aid.  Section 3 and section 4 consider, respectively, the impact of 
temporary aid, and foreign aid in the form of low interest rate loans.  Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. AN OVERLAPPING-GENERATIONS MODEL WITH PERMANENT FOREIGN AID 
2.1. The setup of the model 
Consider a small open economy where individuals live for two periods in overlapping generations.  
An individual derives utility from his/her own consumption of a single good (which for simplicity is 
assumed to occur only in the second period) and from a bequest to his child.  The utility function is:  
ln (1 )ln uc b α α =+ −        ( 1 )  
Where c is consumption in second period, b  is bequest, and α is a parameter that lies between 0 
and 1. 
 
The single good in the economy can be produced with two different technologies, one using only 
unskilled labor and another using both skilled labor and capital.  The production function of the first 
technology is: 
nn
tn t Yw L =           ( 2 )  
where 
n
t L  is unskilled labour in period t, and  n w  is a productivity parameter.  
 
The second technology exhibits constant returns to scale and is described by: 
(,)
s s
tt t YF K L =         ( 3 )  
where  t K , 
s
t L  are capital and skilled labour inputs available in period t, respectively.  For simplicity 
it is assumed that investments in both physical and human capital are made one period in advance 
and there is no capital depreciation.  
 
Each individual is assumed to have one parent and one child, which means that the population 
size remain constant.  In each generation there is a continuum of individuals of sizeL.  All 
individuals are identical except in their levels of inherited wealth.   An individual can either work as 
an unskilled worker in both periods, or he can invest in human capital in the first period and work   5
as a skilled worker in the second period.  If he chooses to invest in human capital, he has to invest 
a fixed amount of h.   
  
Individuals can lend and borrow in a competitive world capital market.  The lending rate is r which 
is assumed to be constant over time.  The borrowing rate is id which is higher than r because the 
lender has to incur monitoring costs to avoid loan defaults.  It is assumed that monitoring raises the 
cost of defaults to debtors, thereby discouraging defaults.  Specifically, if lenders spend a 
monitoring cost of z , the cost to the borrower to default will be  z β , where 1 β > .  
 
Competition in the capital market implies that lenders make zero profits, that is, the differential in 
borrowing and lending rates is driven solely by monitoring costs: 
z r i d d = − ) (           ( 4 )  
where d is the amount borrowed.  
 
In order to prevent defaults, lenders will choose to incur a monitoring cost z  that is just large 
enough to make default unattractive to debtors, i.e.,    
(1 ) d di z β ⋅+ =                    ( 5 )  











            ( 6 )  
 
2.2   Impact of permanent foreign aid 
Now we introduce permanent foreign aid into the model described as above and study its impact 
on individuals’ decisions.  Assume that a fixed amount of permanent foreign aid a is given to each 
individual during his first period of life, such that the individual’s total initial wealth is x a + , the sum 
of his inheritance and the foreign aid. 
 
If an individual decides not to invest in human capital, he works in both periods, lends his funds 
during the first period, consumes in the second period and leaves a bequest of: 
( ) (1 )[(1 )( ) ] nn n bx rxaw w α =− + ++ +             ( 7 )  
His lifetime utility is 
( ) ln[( )(1 ) ] nn n Ux xaw r w ε =+ ++ + +                                                   (8) 
where ln (1 )ln(1 ) ε αα α α =+ −−    6
 
If an individual decides to invest in human capital, and has sufficient funds to do so without 
borrowing (i.e., x ah +≥), he is a lender and leaves a bequest of 
1( ) (1 )[ ( )(1 )] ss bx w xah r α =− ++− +      ( 9 )  
And he has a lifetime utility of  
1() l n [ ( ) ( 1 ) ] ss Ux w xah r ε =+ + − + +        ( 1 0 )  
If an individual decides to invest in human capital, but has insufficient funds (x a + <h ), he is a 
borrower and leaves a bequest of  
2( ) (1 )[ ( )(1 )] ss bx w xah i α =− ++− +        ( 1 1 )  
And he has a lifetime utility of  
2() l n [ ( ) ( 1 ) ] ss Ux w x a h i ε =+ + − + +        ( 1 2 )  
We assume that, for those who have sufficient funds, investment in human capital will have a 
higher payoff.  From equations (8) and (10), this requires that  
(1 ) (2 ) sn wh r w r −+ ≥ +         ( 1 3 )  
For those who do not have sufficient funds, invest in human capital is preferable as long as 
2() () sn UxU x ≥ , that is: 
1
() [ ( 2 ) ( 1 ) ] ns x fa w r h i w a
ir
≥= + + + − −
−
      ( 1 4 )  
In other words, an individual will choose whether or not to invest in human capital depending on 
whether his initial wealth is greater or smaller than () f a .   Hence, initial distribution of wealth 
determines individuals’ education choice, and therefore the proportions of skilled and unskilled 
labour in the economy. 
 
Let  t D  be the distribution of initial wealth (including foreign aid) by individuals born in period t, we 
have: 
0 () tt dD x L
∞
= ∫         ( 1 5 )  
From equation (14), the quantity of skilled labour is given by: 
() ()
s
tt t fa Ld D x
∞
=∫          ( 1 6 )  




tt t L dD x =∫          ( 1 7 )    7
From equation (14), it is clear that as the size of foreign aid (a) increases, the critical value of initial 
wealth f(a) falls and the number of individuals who choose to invest in human capital rises.  Thus 
we have 
 
Proposition 1: At any given time period, permanent foreign aid can increase the proportion of 
individuals who choose to invest in human capital thereby increasing the relative size of skilled 
workers in the economy.  
 
The distribution of initial wealth at period t not only determines individual decisions in period t, but 
also affects inheritance and therefore initial wealth in the next period.  Inheritance in period t+1 is 
described by: 
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2
( ) (1 )[(1 )( ) ] ( )
( ) (1 )[ (1 )( )] ( )
( ) (1 )[ (1 )( )]
nt t n n t
ts t s t t
st s t t
bx rx aw w i f x fa
x bx w ix ah i f f a x ha





=− + ++ + < ⎧
⎪ == − + + + − ≤ < − ⎨
⎪ =− ++ +− −≤ ⎩
                   (18) 
    
The dynamic evolution of wealth distribution can be illustrated in Figure 1.  In Figure 1, lines  n b  
and  s b  depict the dynamic relationship between inheritance and bequest for unskilled and skilled 
workers, respectively.   n b and  s b  intersect at where xt = f(a). 
                                 
                        1 t x +                      s b                           
 
 
                                               n b  
 
 
                    
 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
                                                      () n x a        () f a () ga ha −            () s x a                     t x  
Figure 1:  Dynamic relationships between inheritance and bequest for unskilled and skilled 
workers under permanent aid 
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Figure 1 also depicts the long-run equilibrium levels of inheritance.  If an individual’s inheritance is 
less than () f a , he does not invest in human capital, and all his descendants follow suit.  Their 
inheritances converge to a long-run equilibrium level () n x a : 
(1 ) (2 ) (1 )(1 )
()








−+ + − +
=
−− +
         ( 1 9 )  
 
If an individual’s inheritance is more thanha − , he invests in human capital using his own funds 
and so are all their descendants, generation after generation. Their bequests converge to () s x a : 
(1 )[ (1 )] (1 )(1 )
()
1( 1 ) ( 1 )
s
s





−− + + − +
=
−− +
      ( 2 0 )  
 
If an individual’s inheritance lies between  () f a  andha − , he borrows to invest in human capital, 
however not all of his descendants will invest in human capital.  In order for all his decedents to 
choose to invest in human capital, his inheritance needs to exceed the critical value  () ga 
(1 )[ (1 ) ] (1 )(1 )
()
(1 )(1 ) 1





−+ − − − +
=
−+ −
      ( 2 1 )  
Thus, generations of individuals in this economy form two groups in the long run: rich dynasties 
which converge to an equilibrium with investment in human capital, and poor dynasties which 
converge to an equilibrium with no investment in human capital.  
 
It should be noted Figure 1 is drawn under two implicit assumptions.  Firstly, the slopes of  n b  and 
s b  are smaller than one, at  () n x a  and  () s x a  respectively, which means that the following condition 
holds:  
(1 )(1 ) 1 r α −+ <          ( 2 2 )  
This assumption ensures that the evolution of bequests does not explode over time. The second 
assumption is that the steep part of  s b  has a slope larger than one, which requires that 






−+ = + − >
−
       ( 2 3 )  
This assumes high loan enforcement costs which leads to a relatively large difference between 
lending and borrowing interest rates.   
  
Given assumptions (22) and (23), it is easy to show that as a  increases,  () n x a and  () s x a  
increase.  Thus we have  
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Proposition 2: Permanent foreign aid increases the long run equilibrium levels of wealth for both 
unskilled and skilled workers. 
 
In addition, notice that the long-run number of unskilled workers is the number of individuals who 




tt t Ld D x =∫          ( 2 4 )  
and the long-run number of skilled workers is therefore L - 
() g a
t L . From equation (21), we know that 
as  a  increases, the critical value () gafalls.  This means that in the long run, more individuals will 
choose to invest in human capital and join the skilled group which converges to the high 









−−           ( 2 5 )    
which increases as a  increase. 
 
Hence, we have 
Proposition 3: Permanent foreign aid can increase the relative size of the skilled workers in the 
long run and increase the long run average wealth for the economy as a whole.  
 
Proposition 3 suggests that by enabling initially poor individuals to choose to invest in human 
capital, permanent foreign aid encourages more individuals and their descendents to join the 
skilled (or rich) group, thereby improving the average performance of the economy.  
 
3.   TEMPORARY FOREIGN AID 
In this section we consider how the results of the last section may change if foreign aid is 
temporary (i.e., it is provided for one period only) and targeted (i.e., it is provided to only those who 
do not invest in human capital).  Given such temporary foreign aid (a), in period t, those who would 
not invest in human capital enjoy a total wealth of  t x a + , where  t x  is inheritance from his/her 
parent, and leave a bequest of   
11
2
( ) (1 )[(1 )( ) ],
( ) (1 )[ (1 )( )],
( ) (1 )[ (1 )( )],
nt t n n t
ts t s t t
st s t t
bx rx aw w i f x a f
x bx w ix ah i f f x ah





=− + ++ + +< ⎧
⎪ == − + + + − ≤ + < ⎨
⎪ =− ++ +− +≥ ⎩
   (26) 
 where
1
[( 2 ) ( 1) ] ns f wr h i w
ir
=+ + + −
−
. 
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After period t, there is no foreign aid, and the evolution of bequests over time satisfies the following 
rules: 
11 1
21 1 1 1
21 1 1
( ) (1 )[(1 )( ) ],
( ) (1 )[ (1 )( )],
( ) (1 )[ (1 )( )],
nt t n n t
ts t s t t
st s t t
bx rx w w i f x f
x bx w ix h i f f x h







=− + + + < ⎧
⎪ == − + + − ≤ < ⎨
⎪ =− ++ − ≥ ⎩
                    (27) 
 
From equations (26) and (27), it is clear that a temporary foreign at time t has the effect of 
increasing the bequests of aid recipients, thereby increasing the initial wealth of their descendants 
in period t+1.  Consequently, in period t+1, there will be more people choose to invest in human 
capital.  Moreover, to the extent that the temporary aid lowers the critical value g(a), it also 
increases the long-run equilibrium relative size of skilled workers in the economy.   Thus we have  
 
Proposition 4 Temporary aid affects welfare creation and distribution in the recipient country via a 
similar mechanism as permanent aid.   The main difference is that temporary aid affects initial 
wealth directly for only one period, after which the impact is indirectly through the increased 
bequests of aid recipients.  
 
4.   FAVOURABLE LOAN 
Now we consider the impact of foreign aid in the form of favourable loan provided to individuals 
who choose to borrow to invest in human capital.  Assume that the interest rate for the favourable 
loan d, where rdi << , and the maximum amount of this loan is l. 
 
How will this favourable loan affect individuals’ decisions?  An individual may decide not to invest 
in human capital despite of the availability of the loan.  He will leave a bequest of  
( ) (1 )[(1 )( ) ] nn n bx rxw w α ′ =− + + +                                        (28) 
and enjoys a lifetime utility of 
( ) [( )(1 ) ] nn n Ux I n xw r w ε ′ =++ + +        ( 2 9 )  
where ln (1 )ln(1 ) ε αα α α =+ −− . 
 
An individual with a large inheritance ( x h ≥ ) won’t be affected by the favourable loan.  He invests 
in human capital, leaves a bequest of  1( ) (1 )[ (1 )( )] ss bx w rxh α ′ = −+ + − , and enjoys a life-time 
utility of  
1() [ ( ) ( 1 ) ] ss Ux I n w xh r ε ′ =+ − + +                                    (30) 
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An individual with a small inheritance (x<h) may choose to borrow to invest in human capital.  He 
now faces two types of loans, the favourable loan at an interest rate of d, and a market loan at the 
interest rate of i.  If x lh +<, he will borrow the maximum amount l at the favourable rate, and the 
remainder at the market rate.  His bequest is  2( ) (1 )[ (1 ) ( )(1 )] ss bx wl d hxl i α ′ = −− + − − − + , and his 
lifetime utility is 
2() [ ( 1 ) ( ) ( 1 ) ] ss Ux I n wl d h x l i ε ′ =− + − − − + +                            (31) 
Ifx lh +≥, then he only needs to borrow at the favourable rate.  His bequest is 
3( ) (1 )[ ( )(1 )] ss bx w hx d α ′ =− −− + , and his lifetime utility is  
3() [ ( ) ( 1 ) ] ss Ux I n w h x d ε ′ =− − + +                                          (32) 
 
Similar to the cases above, we assume that investment in human capital has a higher payoff to an 
individual if the individual has sufficient funs to invest.  This means, from equations (29) and (30), 
that: 
(1 ) (2 ) sn wh iw r −+ ≥ +  
 
For those individuals who need to borrow to invest in human capital, they will choose to invest as 
long as  2() () sn UxU x ′′ ≥ , that is 
1
() [ ( 2 ) ( 1 ) ( ) ] ns x fl w r h i w li d
ir
≥= + + + − − −
−
 
In other words, individuals whose inheritance is smaller than () f l ) prefer not to invest in human 
capital.  Human capital investment is, therefore, limited to individuals with large enough 
inheritance.  Let  t D  be the distribution of inheritances by individuals born in period t.  This 
distribution satisfies 
0 () tt dD x L
∞
= ∫  
The number of skilled workers is 
() ()
s
tt t fl Ld D x




tt t Ld D x ′ =∫  
  





( ) (1 )[(1 )( ) ], ( )
( ) (1 )[ (1 ) ( )(1 )], ( ) ,
( ) (1 )[ ( )(1 )], ( ) ,
( ) (1 )[ ( )(1 )],
nt t n n t
st s t t t
t
st s t t t
st s t t
bx rx w w i f x f l
bx w l d hxl i i f f l x h xlh
x
bx w hx d i f f l x h xlh






′ =− + + + < ⎧
⎪ ′ =− − + −−− + ≤< + < ⎪ = ⎨ ′ =− −− + ≤< + ≥ ⎪
⎪ ′ =− + − + ≥ ⎩
  (33) 
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The features of this evolution over time are depicted in Figure 2.  In Figure 2,  n b′  and  s b′  describe 
the dynamic relationships between inheritance and bequest for unskilled and skilled workers, 
respectively.   n b′  and  s b′ intersect at where xt =  () f l .   
                                                
 
            1 t x +                                      s b′ 
                                                                                         






                                                  n x           () f l () gl hl −    h                       s x                  t x                   
Figure 2: Dynamic relationships between inheritance and bequest under favourite loan 
 
As shown in Figure 2, individuals who inherit less than  () f l  do not invest in human capital and 
neither do their descendants in future generations.  Their inheritances converge to a long-run level 
n x  
(1 ) (2 )












Individuals who inherit more than  () f l invest in human capital but after some generations, their 
descendants will choose not to invest.  To ensure investment in human capital in all future 
generations, it is necessary that inheritance in period t is greater than the critical value  () gl 
(1 )[ (1 ) ( )]
()
(1 )(1 ) 1









Individuals whose inheritance is greater than g(l), including those with inheritance more than h, 
invest in human capital and so will all their descendants. Their inheritances converge to  s x      
(1 )[ (1 )]
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Similar to that in Figure 1, we assume that the steepest part of  s b′ has a slope greater than 1, 
which means that(1 )(1 ) 1 i α −+ > .  Given this assumption, it is easy to show that  () gl decreases 
as l increases.  Since the long-run number of unskilled workers is the number of individuals who 




tt t Ld D x =∫  
The long-run number of skilled workers is L-
() g l
t L , which increases as l increases.  In other words, 
the larger is the maximum amount of favourable loans, the more individuals will choose to borrow 










which increases as l increase.  Therefore we have: 
Proposition 5 Foreign aid in the form of favourable loan encourages more individuals to borrow to 
invest in human capital. As a result, it increases the relative size of skilled workers in the long run 
and increases the average long-run wealth of the recipient economy.  
 
It should be noted that both permanent aid and favourable loans decrease the critical value of 
inheritance above which individuals will choose human capital investment generation after 
generation.  The main between the two forms of aid is that permanent aid raises both the 
equilibrium wealth levels for unskilled and skilled workers, and the relative size of skilled workers.  
In contrast, favourable loans can only raise the average wealth by increasing the relative size of 
individuals belonging to the skilled group.  
 
5.   CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we have explored a plausible mechanism through which foreign aid may affect 
wealth creation and distribution in the recipient country.  We have considered three types of foreign 
aid, permanent foreign aid, temporary aid targeted at unskilled workers, and favourable loans for 
investment in human capital.   All types of aid are found to have the impact of encouraging more 
individuals to invest in human capital thereby increasing the relative size of skilled individuals 
which in turn increases the average wealth of the economy.  Permanent aid has the largest impact, 
followed by favourable loans and temporary aid.   
 
The key feature of our model is that there are two long-run equilibria.  If foreign aid is sufficiently 
large such that the initial wealth of all individuals in a given period is greater the critical value, it is 
theoretically possible that all individuals will choose to invest in human capital, and there will only   14
be a single equilibrium with a high level of wealth although it is unrealistic to rely on foreign aid to 
push an economy to a rich long-run equilibrium.  
 
Finally it is worth noting that this paper investigates only one possible mechanism through which 
foreign aid may improve the welfare of the recipient country.  It has not taken into account the 
issue of fungibility of foreign aid, nor does it consider any interactions between foreign aid and 
physical capital accumulation.  We therefore would be reluctant to draw definite policy implications 
from the results.  Future research is warranted to study the interactions between foreign aid, 
investment in physical and human capital, and policy environment of the recipient country.   
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